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Computational Deception (Invited Talk) 
Anton Nijholt 
Abstract — In the future our daily life interactions with other people, with computers, robots and smart environments will be 
recorded and interpreted by computers or embedded intelligence in environments, furniture, robots, displays, and 
wearables. These sensors record our activities, our behaviour, and our interactions. Fusion of such information and 
reasoning about such information makes it possible, using computational models of human behaviour and activities, to 
provide context- and person-aware interpretations of human behaviour and activities, including determination of attitudes, 
moods, and emotions. Sensors include cameras, microphones, eye trackers, position and proximity sensors, tactile or smell 
sensors, et cetera. Sensors can be embedded in an environment, but they can also move around, for example, if they are 
part of a mobile social robot or if they are part of devices we carry around or are embedded in our clothes or body. Our daily 
life behaviour and daily life interactions are recorded and interpreted. How can we use such environments and how can 
such environments use us? Do we always want to cooperate with these environments; do these environments always want 
to cooperate with us? We argue that there are many reasons that human inhabitants of these environments do want to keep 
information about their intentions and their emotions hidden. Also their artificial interaction partner may have similar reasons 
to not give away all information they have or to treat their human partner as an opponent rather than someone that has to be 
supported. We survey situations where we can expect that human and artificial partner will not be honest to each other and 
will hide what they think, want or intend. These situations occur when the computer gets involved in social interaction, 
commerce and negotiation, and sports and games. 
Index Terms — Conversations, Deception, Games, Human-computer interaction, Lies, Sports 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
n 1982 Time Magazine made the computer 
‘Machine of the Year’. Until then, famous 
people such as Ronald Reagan, Lech 
Walesa and Ayatullah Khomeini had been 
chosen as ‘Man of the Year’. That tradition 
was continued after 1982. Interestingly, in 
2006 it was again the computer that appeared 
on the cover of Time magazine in its yearly 
election of the ‘Person of the Year’. However, 
now it said, ‘You.’ ‘Yes you. You control the 
Information Age. Welcome to your world.’ This 
change from making the computer the 
machine of the year to a statement in which it 
is assumed to be necessary to make explicit 
that humans are in control illustrates that 
indeed, there can be doubts who is in control. 
Interaction with a computer in a human-like 
way has been the topic of research since the 
time of the early computers. Chatbots, 
question-answering systems and dialogue 
systems, have been designed and during the 
1980s and the 1990s of the previous century 
such systems have been demonstrated in 
research environments. But, it is the computer 
that tells us how to issue commands and 
requests. The user has to adapt to the 
system, he or she is commanded to provide 
information at a time and in a way the system 
is assumed to be able to understand. 
Despite slow progress in natural, intuitive 
and human-like human-computer interaction, 
it nevertheless remains a main research aim. 
There is optimism when looking at modelling 
human-computer interaction, in particular 
when looking at modelling nonverbal aspects 
of such interaction. New sensor technology 
has made it possible to track nonverbal 
interaction cues and activities. Current 
research activity, for example in various large-
scale European research projects, is aiming at 
using sensor technology and sensor data 
interpretation of nonverbal aspects of human-
human interaction and of human behaviour 
activity in general. Again, as has been the 
leading principle of research in the past, the 
assumption is that we can model human-
human interaction, preferably in a multi-party 
interaction setting, and that this knowledge 
can be used to design more ‘natural’ 
interfaces between humans and computer-
supported environments in ‘daily-life’ 
situations. 
In these environments our daily life behaviour 
and daily life interactions are recorded and 
interpreted. How can we use such environments 
and how can such environments use us? Do we 
always want to cooperate with these 
environments; do these environments always 
want to cooperate with us? We argue that there 
are many reasons that users or rather human 
partners of these environments do want to keep 
information about their intentions and their 
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emotions hidden from these smart 
environments. On the other hand, their artificial 
interaction partner may have similar reasons to 
not give away all information they have or to 
treat their human partner as an opponent rather 
than someone that has to be supported by smart 
technology. This will be elaborated in this talk. 
We will survey examples of human-computer 
interactions where there is not necessarily a goal 
to be explicit about intentions and feelings. 
Hence, we will look at (1) the computer as a 
conversational partner, (2) the computer as a 
butler or diary companion, (3) the computer as a 
teacher or a trainer, acting in a virtual training 
environment (a serious game), (4) sports 
applications (that are not necessarily different 
from serious game or education environments), 
and games and entertainment applications. 
2 COOPERATION AND NON-COOPERATION 
When modelling human-computer interaction, 
the main assumption is that users are 
cooperative. They have no choice. In [1] this is 
called the Cooperative Principle: Make your 
contribution such as it is required, at the stage 
at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or 
direction of the talk exchange in which you are 
engaged. Speakers (generally) observe the 
cooperative principle, and listeners (generally) 
assume that speakers are observing it 
(conversational implicature). Grice also 
introduced some Conversational Maxims, 
such as the Maxim of Quantity: Make your 
contribution to the conversation as informative 
as necessary; and Do not make your 
contribution to the conversation more 
informative than necessary. There are other 
Maxims. The Maxim of Quality: Do not say 
what you believe to be false; and Do not say 
that for which you lack adequate evidence. 
The Maxim of Relevance: Be relevant (i.e., 
say things related to the current topic of the 
conversation). And, the Maxim of Manner:  
Avoid obscurity of expression; Avoid 
ambiguity; Be brief; and Be orderly. 
This Gricean view has been attacked, 
extended and refined. There have been 
discussions about these principles and 
maxims and whether they are descriptive and 
prescriptive, refinements have been 
introduced that include ethical considerations 
and refinements have been introduced that 
look at the importance of nonverbal 
communication and how nonverbal signals 
should be included in these views (see e.g. 
[2]). Many researchers looked at ways to 
model mutual and cooperative understanding 
of face-to-face human-human understanding. 
And, they were quite willing to look beyond 
these Gricean principles.  
As mentioned before, there are many daily-
life situations where people don’t follow the 
Gricean rules. That may be because of, for 
example, self interest, indifference, 
competition, politeness or respect. People 
may aim, consciously or unconsciously, at 
keeping the interaction going, rather than on 
aiming at satisfying the Gricean maxims. And, 
there are many real-life interaction situations 
that we want to model in human-computer or 
human-robot interaction where the computer, 
the social robot, or the virtual human may 
disagree with us, consider us an opponent 
rather than acting as a virtual agent that 
always agrees with us and performs our 
wishes, or simply tries to persuade us to do or 
forget about doing certain things. We can find 
such situations in electronic commerce 
applications, ‘negotiation’ situations, daily-life 
conversations, training and sports situations, 
and game and entertainment situations. 
3 SITUATIONS REQUIRING NATURAL DECEPTIVE 
INTERACTIONS 
3.1 Conversations, Q&A, & Dialogues 
When we look at existing chatbots, question-
answering systems, automatic speech 
telephone services or natural language 
dialogue systems it is clear that users have to 
adapt to the system and no natural interaction 
can take place. Users of these systems are 
assumed to be cooperative and in practice 
need to use a lot of empathy in order to get 
the system perform for what it has been 
designed. 
As an extreme example consider the 
ALICE conversational system. Let’s look at an 
example of an Alice dialogue that came up 
when we researched the possibility of a virtual 
diary companion for soldiers on a mission in 
Afghanistan. The virtual diary companion was 
designed to provide empathic support, 
stimulating soldiers to express their feelings 
while making entries in the diary [3]. 
Soldier: I've had a terrible day. 
ALICE: What happened to it? 
Soldier: First we were under attack. 
ALICE: And then what happened? And second? 
Soldier: Then our vehicle struck a landmine. 
ALICE: Fascinating. It would be nice if our 
vehicle struck a landmine. 
Soldier: Then my best friend got killed. 
ALICE: Good reasoning. How well do you know 
this person? 
It is assumed, and at least topic of 
research, that in the future there is the 
possibility to have dialogue and 
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conversational systems that will be used and 
will be appreciated by their users. This may be 
expected because the system learns to know 
about the user from his or her interaction 
history including preferences, interests, and 
attitudes. Moreover, apart from speech and 
language, there are other modalities that 
provide information from user to system. 
Gestures, facial expressions, body postures, 
gaze behaviour, and other information that 
can be measured (e.g., (neuro)physiological 
information) can be used by an interaction 
system to provide relevant feedback. It should 
be mentioned that in several human-human 
interaction studies it has been shown that 
there are situations where nonverbal cues are 
more important in conveying a speaker’s 
message than the meaning of the words that 
are used. This is in particular true when 
attitudes or feelings are communicated. Cf. 
Mehrabian [4] who introduced the following 
rule: “Total Liking = 7% Verbal Liking + 38% 
Vocal Liking + 55% Facial Liking.” 
Consider the progress that is being made 
to make a computer a conversational partner. 
The computer can be represented as a virtual 
friend that knows about us and to whom we 
can talk in a confidential way. It may be a 
virtual butler that also knows about us and 
maybe even knows more about us than a real 
friend, to whom we can talk to in a less 
confidential way. In real life, whoever we talk 
to, we don’t display all our feelings or are 
explicit about all our goals. We don’t provide 
all information we have. Sometimes that is to 
protect ourselves from unwanted intimacy; 
sometimes it is to protect our conversational 
partner from information that may be harmful 
for him or her. We keep back information, we 
lie, and we manipulate. There are studies that 
tell us how many ‘lies’ we are using every day. 
In many cases these ‘lies’ are functional. They 
are not that important and they keep the 
conversation going. When we have useful 
applications for virtual conversational 
partners, do we always want them to be 
completely honest and really mean what they 
say during a conversation?  
We can conclude that in social interaction 
settings, that is, in a setting where a virtual 
human or a social robot is used as a 
conversational partner, there are good 
reasons to have this artificial partner 
knowingly accepting that its human partner is 
not necessarily following the Gricean 
principles and adapts to a verbal and 
nonverbal exchange where it does not follow 
these rules itself (e.g. by displaying deceptive 
nonverbal behaviour [5], rather than what 
could be considered spontaneous behaviour). 
Detecting that a human conversational partner 
is not following these rules (consciously or 
unconsciously) is becoming possible by 
technology that senses all kinds of non-verbal 
communication information (from speech, 
gaze, head and body movements, and 
physiological information, including brain and 
muscle activity measurements... 
3.2 Commerce, Negotiation, Persuasion 
During daily conversations we are not always 
honest. These conversations do not 
necessarily have a particular aim. The 
situation is different when we consider verbal 
and nonverbal interaction between a human 
and an (embodied) agent in an electronic 
commerce setting. The aim of the agent, 
reflecting the aim of its designers and owners, 
can be to sell as many products and services 
as possible. Such an agent will not follow the 
Gricean cooperative principle. Neither will an 
agent that participates in an online auction or 
an agent that is meant to persuade a citizen to 
behave in a certain way. These agents take a 
certain perspective in their interaction and do 
not necessarily provide fully complete or fully 
correct information. They are not necessarily 
sincere. In their interaction with other agents 
or humans they have to decide when and how 
to honest and when and how to deceive and 
when and how to hide information. For that 
reason, in [6] it is argued that “Agents are and 
will be designed, selected or trained to 
deceive, and people will be deceived by and 
will deceive their own agents.” 
Even a personal assistant agent can 
decide to deceive its ‘owner’ or conceal 
certain information because it knows more 
about, among other things, legal 
consequences of actions, consequences for 
long-term goals and preferences that a user 
has, or consequences for health. 
3.3 Teaching, Training, Serious Games 
Computing intelligence and computing power 
can be embedded in a virtual teacher or a 
teaching environment. Teachers do not always 
act in an explicit cooperative way. It can be 
useful to provoke, challenge, or tease a 
student. It can be useful to use humour, to 
play the role of a non-understanding 
conversational partner and to display faked 
emotions. At the same time, a student 
interacting with a teacher or a virtual teacher 
has a strategy that aims at getting a good 
assessment of his or her knowledge and 
motivation. The computer-controlled virtual 
teacher needs to be aware of this. The 
student is not necessarily aware of the 
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strategies of a human teacher or the 
strategies that have been included in a virtual 
educational environment and an embodied 
virtual teacher. Neither the student, nor the 
teacher is playing according the Gricean 
rules. There is nothing wrong with that, but in 
order to act naturally and to be effective, a 
virtual teacher or teaching environment should 
be able to detect, analyze and synthesize 
such behaviour in order to generate 
understanding and empathic behaviour in 
order to take care of natural face-to-face 
interaction. 
Virtual reality environments are used for 
teaching and training situations. In these 
environments events are simulated and 
trainees can ‘enter’ these environments in 
order to learn to collaborate with human or 
virtual team mates, enter into situations where 
they have to negotiate with human or virtual 
partners, or enter situations where they have 
to fight human or virtual opponents. An 
example of such a ‘serious’ or role-playing 
game is the virtual human doctor project [7].  
The setting is a clinic somewhere in Iraq. The 
trainee is an army captain who has to 
persuade a doctor to move his clinic because 
of a planned military operation. This has to be 
done without revealing details of the military 
operation. Obviously, and being part of the 
training situation, the doctor is not necessarily 
cooperative. This requires the modelling of 
non-cooperative behaviour.  
3.4 Sports, Games, and Entertainment 
Presently we see research and the 
development of technology that aim at 
developing sensor-equipped and intelligent 
exercise and training environments. 
Microphones detect speech and sound, 
cameras detect movements of the body, the 
limbs and changes of facial expressions, there 
are sensors that detect positions and 
proximities, and physiological sensors provide 
information about body and mental state of a 
user of these exercise or training 
environments. These environments aim at 
improving the health of their users, for 
example by displaying a motivating virtual 
environment, a virtual coach, and a fitness 
exercise program. Interpretation of the 
information obtained from the sensors allows 
the environment, probably represented by a 
virtual human, to match actual behaviour with 
desired behaviour, and to adapt its 
appearance and its feedback strategies to the 
performance of the user [8]. One of the things 
that we noticed is that a trainer needs to be 
aware that a user is not necessarily honest in 
his or her verbal or nonverbal attitude towards 
a trainer. He or she can hide fatigue or 
exaggerate fatigue. The virtual trainer has the 
possibility to know about this and has to 
decide how to deal with this. This includes 
deciding whether the trainer’s knowledge 
about a user’s deceptive behaviour should be 
communicated to the user. It is not always in 
the interest of the user or the trainer to speak 
the truth. 
In sports and games deceptive actions are 
part of the game. They are meant to divert 
attention from one’s real purpose. Hence, in 
virtual training and recreational environments 
a trainer or in particular a game opponent is 
not only allowed, but also expected to have 
nonverbal behaviour that is aimed at 
deception. Just to mention an example, 
suppose we have a virtual fencing trainer. Its 
main job will be to exercise recognizing and 
generating deception behaviour. Similarly, we 
can look at virtual or mediated boxers, 
baseball players or rugby players [9]. 
4 MISTRUST 
In many of the situations described above, the 
computer can interact with us in playful, 
exercise, entertainment, sports, and serious 
gaming environments. In these environments 
we can expect that situations we can expect 
that non-cooperative and deceiving behaviour 
is there. It is part of a game, it is part of 
training, and it is part of an exercise 
programme. It may be the case, and it was an 
essential theme in Stanley Kubrick’s movie 
2001, that we simply do not trust an advice or 
a decision made by an extremely intelligent 
computer and that we verbally and 
nonverbally try to deceive this computer, 
assuming that we know better. In a well-
known fragment of this movie one of the 
astronauts (Dave Bowman) takes the decision 
to hide his suspicion that HAL, the intelligent 
computer, is not able to handle a particular 
dangerous situation. Or, at least, not willing to 
handle this situation in the (life-saving) 
interest of the astronauts. Dave decides to 
discuss this situation with his co-pilot, but is 
not aware that HAL has eyes everywhere and 
is aware of this discussion. Later, trying to 
convince HAL to adapt the mission’s aims, 
HAL is able to confront Dave with this 
overheard discussion and refuses to make 
any changes to the mission. Nevertheless, 
Dave’s empathy, trying to understand HAL’s 
way of feeling and reasoning, turns out to be 
stronger than HAL’s understanding of Dave’s 
intentions. The ‘2001’ movie is science-fiction, 
but nevertheless. The discussion between 
Dave and HAL is about trust, mistrust and 
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assuming that your conversational partner’s 
aim has interests others than your and tries to 
deceive you. 
HAL: This mission is too important for me to 
allow you to jeopardize it. 
DAVE BOWMAN: I don't know what you're 
talking about, HAL? 
HAL: I know you and Frank were planning to 
disconnect me, and I'm afraid that's something I 
cannot allow to happen. 
DAVE BOWMAN: Where the hell did you get 
that idea, HAL?  
HAL got that idea by observing Dave and 
Frank discussing how to deal with him while 
assuming their conversation was hidden from 
artificial eyes and ears sensors in the 
environment. Wrong idea, HAL knew. 
Clearly, here, we cannot say what has to be 
done. Do we want to negotiate with the 
computer, do we want to compromise, or do 
we want to overrule the computer whatever 
his arguments are? Or is it up to the computer 
to choose among these alternatives? 
Whatever we choose, interaction models 
aware of different perspectives, different aims 
and different truths need to be designed. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
There are many reasons why we need to deal 
with deceptive verbal and nonverbal 
interaction. We looked at natural 
conversations and why such conversations 
profit from not always showing true feelings, 
we looked at commerce and negotiation 
situations where users are not assumed to 
show their feelings, we looked at game, 
training and simulation environments where 
users have to compete, obey and adjust their 
behavior to demands and preferences of their 
coaches, their team mates, and their virtual 
opponents. In all these situations some 
modeling of non-cooperative behavior, 
empathic behavior, persuasive behavior, and 
some modeling of coaching or teaching 
behavior is required. In games we see 
research attempts to make the ‘non-playing’ 
characters more autonomous by providing 
them with intelligence and social behavior. 
When this is done, these characters need to 
know about competition, disagreement, 
aggressiveness and violence. There is also 
discussion about bringing games more into 
the real world, that is, it is expected that in the 
future more competitive situations will be 
designed in the real world that allow playful 
deception. 
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